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A National Law as an Actor–network: 
How Guatemala’s General Electricity Law of 
1996 Shaped the Country’s Environmental 
Conflicts over Hydroelectricity 
Renato PONCIANO*a  
a Università di Padova 
This paper uses controversy mapping to study the history of Guatemala’s 
General Electricity Law (GGEL, 1996). Particular attention is paid to the 
impact of the GGEL on social conflicts related to hydroelectricity. This article 
discusses how an array of actors –right–wing political parties and influencers, 
the ‘El Niño’ Phenomenon, the international wave of neoliberalism and a 
malfunctioning dam– coalesced to promote a law intended to modernize  
Guatemala’s energy market and expand its electrical grid.  
 Twenty years later, GGEL remains a relevant actor in the conflicts around 
new hydroelectricity projects. However, counter to the intentions of its 
promoters, this law has helped to fuel controversy.  
First, it indirectly imposes restrictions on negotiations among project  
stakeholders by forbidding the sale of energy to third parties; thus, it deprives 
actors of their strongest bargaining asset. Second, GGEL makes territorial 
interdependence invisible, shifting the costs and responsibilities from the 
government and companies to communities. Finally, while other studies have 
simply portrayed GGEL as a result of neoliberalism, an Actor–network theory 
(ANT) approach provides a broader picture of its origin and impact by taking 
into account the GGEL’s role as a non–human actor. 
Keywords: Actor–network theory; environmental conflicts; hydroelectricity; 
controversy mapping 
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The Guatemalan energy contradiction 
Guatemala’s Human Development Index is the third lowest in Latin 
America (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). One overlooked 
cause of this low score is energy. As of 2013, more than 50% of Guatemala’s 
energy consumption came from domestic biomass, i.e., firewood 
(International Energy Agency, 2016), obtained in an unsustainable manner.  
This consumption is an indicator of environmental degradation, lack of 
access to electricity or gas, and a high incidence of respiratory diseases.  
Reducing the use of unsustainably obtained biomass and replacing it with a 
sustainable source would be a good step toward improving Guatemala’s 
human development.   
Guatemala has the potential to achieve this improvement. The 
Guatemalan government’s document Política Energética 2013–2027 
(Guatemala, Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 2013) estimates that less than 
15% of the country’s energy potential for hydroelectricity is being used 
currently. That potential supply is enough to satisfy current and future 
domestic demand and even export energy to neighbouring countries. This 
potential contrasts with the current reality that 40% of the country’s 
electricity is generated using imported fossil fuels (Guatemala, Ministerio de 
Energía y Minas, 2016a), which causes higher prices and larger carbon 
emissions. 
A common sense perspective would mean that these two situations have 
a common solution: exploit the underused renewable resources to make the 
supply of energy larger and cheaper, especially for that portion of the 
population with the lowest human development. This solution would allow 
them to abandon their unsustainable firewood use and its negative impact.  
In 1996, the Guatemalan Government claimed that it would address this 
problem by privatizing the public electricity utilities and passed the General 
Electricity Law, which de–monopolized the electricity market. The idea was 
that the necessary expansion of the electrical grid would be fostered by 
competition and private investment. Now, 20 years later, there are 19 
hydroelectric power plants in operation, and another 30 will start operation 
within the next five years. It would seem that this is a story of policy success, 
and of a government working to improve people’s lives.  
However, the expansion of hydroelectricity resulted in conflict with a 
significant part of the nearby communities. Orantes (2010) reported that in 
2010, there were verified reports of 27 protests or conflicts in 9 
departments (provinces), where a total of 18 projects were authorized or in 
operation. This aspect of the expansion of the electrical grid was 
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unexpected, and it delayed, and in some cases completely halted, the 
development. Something clearly was not taken into account when this 
endeavour started. 
This article reports the partial results of a research project on this 
hydroelectricity expansion in Guatemala. The project consists of two parallel 
inquiries, one of which is a map of the controversy around hydroelectricity 
projects. As the cartography of the controversy advanced, one element 
emerged as central to the issue: Guatemala’s General Electricity Law of 1996 
(GGEL). Hence, a more precise account of its history is needed.  That is the 
main purpose of this paper. 
Theoretical and methodological framework 
This case is analysed using Actor–network theory (ANT). ANT, according 
to Latour (2005), is both a theoretical and a methodological approach to 
social research. One of the most important contributions of ANT is the 
principle of symmetry (Latour, 1987) which, among other things, states that, 
in research, non–humans are to be treated equally as humans, i.e. studied in 
the same way. Therefore, non–humans can be actors (or as Latour calls 
them, ‘actants’) and are capable of agency in the face of others. This fits 
particularly well in this case, since the principal subject is a non–human 
entity, Guatemala’s General Electricity Law (GGEL).  The purpose here is to 
show the network of actors and trajectories that converged in the passing of 
this law, but also how those actors, and even others, were also influenced or 
transformed by GGEL. 
The methodological dimension of ANT is usually referred to as 
controversy mapping (Latour, 2005). A good introduction to the subject is 
the article by Venturini (2012) that details how ANT’s approach translates 
into method guidelines. As an example, this method has been applied 
successfully in the work of Neresini and Lorenzet (2016) to cases in the 
Italian context. Furthermore, dedicated software tools have been developed 
recently for mapping controversies, thus allowing researchers to organize, 
analyse and visualize information on actors and events (Sciences Po 
Medialab, 2016). 
The narrative presented here is part of the first phase, based on 
document research and journalistic coverage of the events; in particular, the 
online archive of Crónica (Universidad Francisco Marroquin, 2013), a 
Guatemalan magazine that was published from 1987 to 1998, and was one 
of the most credible sources of the time. Every news story, opinion article or 
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small note in Crónica related to the Guatemalan electrical grid was 
registered in a spreadsheet. Then, a timeline that pointed to key actors and 
events was made based on that list. Additional sources were used to 
establish connections among them, with the aid of digital resources.  
Assembling GGEL: How Chixoy Dam, neoliberalism 
and an armed conflict converged in a new 
electricity law 
For the purpose of this paper, a good starting point is the development 
of the largest publicly–owned hydropower plant in Guatemala: Chixoy 
(1978–1985). This project was designed to provide more than 50% of the 
electricity needed in Guatemala at the time, and bring stability to the 
electrical grid.  However, its development turned out to be a managerial 
nightmare:  it took more than twice the projected building time, its budget 
quadrupled (from USD $187 million to almost $800 million) and when it was 
finally opened in 1983, a critical flaw in the tunnels delayed its operation 
until 1985 (Velásquez and Mazariegos, 1991). But the problem was not 
solely inefficiency; the plant was built within a context of a state effectively 
under the control of the military as a result of an armed conflict with a leftist 
guerrilla movement. This conflict became, around the time that Chixoy was 
being developed, a human rights tragedy, since the Guatemalan Army 
started massacring entire Mayan villages as part of its war strategy. One of 
the best documented episodes was the Rio Negro Massacre, in which more 
than 500 people were killed, including women and children. It was 
perpetrated in order to evict the Maya that lived in the area destined to be 
flooded by the Chixoy dam (Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico de 
Guatemala, 1999). 
Two public utilities in a military–dominated state 
Just the Rio Negro Massacre is enough to think of Chixoy as one of the 
most shameful episodes in modern Guatemalan history. But Chixoy also 
represented the inefficient management of the state in those times. In a 
government controlled by a military undertaking counterinsurgent 
operations, military commanders devised corruption networks that were so 
powerful that they have survived to this day. In its efforts to uproot them, 
Guatemala is the first country in the world to have an UN–approved foreign 
Prosecutorial Commission to fight them, the International Commission 
A National Law as an Actor–network 
121 
against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) (Comisión Internacional contra la 
Impunidad en Guatemala, 2016). 
After a coup in 1982, and a new Constitution in 1985, Vinicio Cerezo, 
from the left–centre party Democracia Cristiana became (in 1986) the first 
democratically–elected president of Guatemala in decades. The year after 
his election, the first crisis of the electrical grid occurred, when the water 
level in the Chixoy Dam descended below its functioning minimum. A report 
from Crónica at the time cited as causes the inadequate operation and 
maintenance of the plant and deforestation in the surrounding area. Old 
thermal power plants were reactivated to avoid power outages countrywide 
(Anahté, 1987). 
The government entity in charge of the electrical grid in most of the 
country was the Instituto Nacional de Electrificación (National Institute of 
Electrification, INDE), except in Guatemala City and three departments, 
where it was the Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala (Guatemalan Electrical 
Company, EEGSA), a mixed–capital company owned mostly by the State.   
The situation at the time is described in the webpage of INDE’s labour union, 
STINDE, as follows: ‘full of cronies and overstaffed; management engaged in 
labour abuse to the extreme of assault; constant sexual harassment to 
women, layoffs without justification; all–level corruption, and intervention 
by the military’ (STINDE, 2015).   
Operational malfunctions and overall mismanagement continued over 
the years. The energy crisis reached a peak in 1991 when, in addition to all 
its problems, a drought caused by the climate phenomenon El Niño reduced 
the level of water in Chixoy dam to a historic low. Two months of 
programmed power outages were scheduled to prevent the collapse of the 
electrical grid (Velásquez and Mazariegos, 1991). Again, in 1994, there was 
another period of power outages, when El Niño returned (Mazariegos and 
Morales, 1994), this time under President Ramiro De León (1993–1996). The 
disastrous situation of the electrical grid was, by then, the centre of a public 
discussion about the reforms needed to guarantee the energy supply for the 
country. At this point, it is useful to change the focus onto the political and 
ideological debates of those decades that shaped the response to this crisis. 
A turn to the right everywhere 
Politically, the tide turned to the right worldwide between 1970 and 
1990, in what now is called the rise of neoliberalism (Monbiot, 2016).  
Guatemala was no exception. A key figure in promoting neoliberalism in 
Guatemala was Manuel Ayau, a member of the Guatemalan elites (Casaús 
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Arzú, 2007, p. 138). He was a member of the classical liberal elite Mont 
Pelerin Society and the most vocal right–wing intellectual of the late 20th  
 
Figure X Ad in an issue of Crónica Magazine (Anahté, 1997). Licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial–NonDerivative license 3.0. 
Available at: http://cronica.ufm.edu/index.php/DOC468.pdf. 
century in Guatemala. In 1959, he founded the first conservative think–
tank in Guatemala, and Francisco Marroquín University (UFM) in 1971 
(Ibargüen, 2010). UFM is an institution that, according to an article in the 
conservative magazine National Review (Nordlinger, 2016), ‘classical liberals 
or Reagan conservatives [call] too good to be true’. 
Ayau and other people linked to the UFM promoted in the media the 
classic neoliberal agenda: deregulation, privatization and the downsizing of 
the government. As early as 1972, Ayau was arguing for the privatization of 
public companies (Ayau, 1972).  These ideas started to permeate the 
thinking of mainstream political parties and government officials. According 
to STINDE, the first privatization attempt of the electric utilities in 
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Guatemala occurred in 1986 (STINDE, 2015), during the Cerezo 
Administration, which by reputation was a left–centre government.   
Successive administrations were gradually more right–leaning and pro–
neoliberal ideas. President De León, for example, was from a centrist party, 
but in power, his policies became conservative and business–friendly. The 
media at the time also advanced the neoliberal agenda; it was also 
championed by business associations and think tanks. Take for example the 
advertisement above (fig. 1) with no sponsor from 1997. It reads:  ‘What did 
Francois Miterrand, socialist president of France, do to modernize its 
economy? Privatize (…) to privatize is not ideological, to privatize is to 
modernize’.   
President De León presented in 1995 the first GGEL bill, which was 
portrayed as the solution to the problems plaguing the electrical grid, but it 
did not make it through Congress. Alvaro Arzú, another member of the 
historical elite of Guatemala (Casaús Arzú, 2007, p. 92) from the Partido de 
Avanzada Nacional (National Advancement Party, PAN), won the next 
elections. His administration promoted a clear neoliberal agenda, including 
selling public electric utilities and opening the electricity market (García 
Kihn, 1996). The most important piece of legislation for these 
transformations was GGEL. After some opposition, their bill passed in 1996 
(Morales Monzón, 1996).    
Figure 2 provides a visual presentation of the array of actors that led to 
the GGEL. To summarize:  
(a) A weak state controlled by the military in the midst of a 
counterinsurgency war results in the inefficient and corrupt management of 
the public electricity utilities. 
(b) The climate phenomenon El Niño repeatedly led to droughts that 
affected the capacity of Chixoy, the largest hydroelectric power plant in 
Guatemala, creating a power crisis.  
(c) The inadequate government response of a series of programmed 
power cuts and a return to importing fuel for power generation makes 
energy policy a national matter with public pressure to restructure the 
electricity sector. 
(d) An international political turn toward neoliberalism Guatemala 
manifests as progressively more right–wing administrations inclined to 
neoliberal ideas. 
(e) The advancement of the neoliberal agenda by think tanks, traditional 
elite members and ‘Reagan conservative’ academics in Guatemala led to 
privatization being the favoured policy response. 
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(f) All of which converged into a solution to the electricity problem: the 
GGEL of 1996.  
 
 
Figure 2   The network that originated GGEL (prepared by the author). 
How GGEL became an influential actor on the 
network that originated it 
The opening statement of the GGEL declares: ‘Since the supply of 
electricity doesn’t satisfy the needs of the Guatemalan population, it is 
necessary to increase its production by means of the liberalization of the 
market’ (Guatemala, Congreso de la República, 1996, p. 1).  It assigns to the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines the responsibility of the electricity sector, and 
among other provisions, also: 
1. Declares that the generation of electricity does not need special 
permits other than those in the Constitution and the laws of the 
country, unless it uses state property (such as hydroelectricity).  
2. Declares that the price of electricity is determined freely between 
the agents of the market (generators, distributors, transportation 
and commercialization companies, and wholesale buyers).  
3. Creates the National Electric Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional 
de Energía Eléctrica, CNEE), the authority in charge of GGEL, 
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overseeing prices, especially for small users and provides arbitration 
between agents of the market. 
4. Creates the figure of the Wholesale Market Manager (Administrador 
del Mercado Mayorista, AMM), whose functions are coordinating 
the energy market and guaranteeing the safety and supply of the 
electrical grid.  
5. Establishes that no company can operate simultaneously two or 
more activities of the electricity business, and gives INDE and EEGSA 
one year to split into different companies. [This provision was 
introduced to mitigate the ‘natural monopoly’ status of the electrical 
grid (Michaels, 1993)]. 
The first wave of the energy expansion: thermal power 
plants 
The following events can be grouped as the set–up stage for the 
expansion of the energy market:  
1. May, 1997.  First National Electric Energy Commission (CNEE) is 
appointed (Comisión Nacional de Energía Eléctrica, 2001). 
2. October, 1997.  INDE is divided in three companies: EGEE 
(generation), ETCEE (transmission), and EDEE (distribution and 
commercialization). Later, EGEE would be divided in DEORSA 
(Electrical Distributor of the East) and DEOCSA (Electrical Distributor 
of the West) in preparation for its privatization (Instituto Nacional 
de Electrificación, 2013). 
3. July, 1998.  EEGSA was sold to an international group led by the 
Spanish company IBERDROLA, for a price of USD $520 million (El 
País, 1998).  Privatization was not a mandate of GGEL but a policy of 
the Arzú Administration. 
4. December, 1998.  INDE’s new distribution companies, DEORSA and 
DEOCSA, were sold in December, to another Spanish corporation, 
Union Fenosa, for USD $101 million (Harris, 2002).  INDE kept the 
other companies. 
5. 2000. The National Association of Generators, ANG (Asociación 
Nacional de Generadores, [no date]) was founded as an industry 
association that represented the private electricity generation 
sector.  
These measures successfully promoted the growth of electricity 
generation in Guatemala.  Table 1 shows the increase in installed capacity 
per primary source from 1985 to 2001.  In the 1996–2001 period, the overall 
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capacity grew 527 MW, while in the previous eleven years it only grew 362 
MW.  Most of it came from thermal plants (351 MW increase), and 
cogeneration (sugarcane bagasse) plants (120 MW); meanwhile, the 
increase for hydropower was minimal, only 22 MW.  This was not a desirable 
situation; partly because of its environmental impact, but mostly because it 
augmented dependence on imported fossil fuels, and left valuable 
renewable resources unexploited. 
Table 1     Guatemala: Electric generation installed capacity per year and source 
(MW). Adapted from (Paz Antolín, 2004). 
Year Total Hydro Geothermal Thermal Cogeneration 
1985 783.4 488.1 –– 295.3 –– 
1990 810.9 488.1 ––– 322.8 –– 
1996 1145.5 502.1 –– 563.4 80.0 
2001 1672.1 524.9 33.0 914.2 200.0 
The second wave of energy expansion: hydroelectricity 
In 2002, the renewable energy companies established the Association of 
Renewable Energy Generators, AGER (Asociación de Generadores de Energía 
Renovable).  On its website, AGER (2016) states that its main objective is ‘to 
organize all private entities whose main activity is the generation of 
electricity from renewable sources, and to set among them a unified 
position in all matters affecting them’.   
Then, in 2003, the Guatemalan Congress passed the Law of Incentives for 
the Development of Renewable Energy Projects (LIDREP) which gave tax 
breaks to new projects.  It was an initiative from President Alfonso Portillo, 
of the right–wing party, Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG).   
After the approval of LIDREP, there was an increase in hydroelectric 
plants.  Figure 3 shows the total number per year of large private plants 
(more than 5 MW capacity), either in operation or approved for 
construction.  Compared to only one plant in 1995, there were 49 in 2016. 
At the same time, the number of new thermal power plants declined, 
starting a shift in the energy matrix of the country and in its ownership, 
since not only were foreign corporations investing in hydroelectricity 
projects, but major Guatemalan ones were, too.  The largest project to date 
is Renace, a complex of five plants on the Cahabón River, with a total 
capacity larger than Chixoy (over 300 Mw).  Renace is being built by the 
Spanish ACS  for Multi–Inversiones Corporation (ICEX España, 2014), one of 
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the largest in Guatemala, owned by the Gutiérrez–Bosch family, another 
prominent group of the Guatemalan elite (Casaús Arzú, 2007, p. 100). 
 
Figure 3   Total Number of HE active projects per year. Data compiled by the author 
from (Guatemala, Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 2016b). 
The rise of conflict over hydroelectricity 
The first conflict over a hydroelectric project was the Rio Negro Massacre 
described above.  This episode is central to understanding the current 
conflicts, since it partially explains the mistrust that rural communities have 
of megaprojects (Orantes, 2010).  While the Rio Negro Massacre occurred 
before the GGEL became law, the focus here will be those conflicts that 
surfaced after its approval, involving mostly private companies.   
After GGEL, the first reported conflict was in the municipality of Rio 
Hondo, Zacapa.  According to Hurtado (2006), concerns were raised after a 
first plant started operating in 2000; protests rose after it became public 
that another two projects were already in motion.  After years of opposition, 
a public consultation vote was held in 2005, resulting in the rejection of the 
project by the community. 
Since then, more conflicts have surfaced.  Orantes (2010) reported 27 
conflict situations in 9 departments as of 2010.  Since 2010, there have been 
more conflicts, including the one that attracted national attention: the 
opposition of the communities of Santa Cruz Barillas, Huehuetenango, to 
the plant Hidro Santa Cruz (a Spanish capital project) in 2012.  It escalated to 
such a degree that riots exploded over the murder of a community leader by 
company security guards; the Government responded by declaring a state of 
emergency and the suspension of some constitutional rights in the area 
(Hernández, 2013). 
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Recently, protests have surfaced around the Renace projects.  In an 
article in the Spanish newspaper El País (Tristán, 2016), locals complained 
about the damages and decrease in the current they have seen in Cahabón 
River since the first two Renace plants were built.  One person told the 
newspaper that the company gave away shovels and fumigators, even 
offered jobs and built a school, but it has not offered to supply them with 
electricity or potable water.  
The role of GGEL in the conflicts 
Today, 30 years after the Chixoy plant was finished, there are, ironically, 
still nearby communities that do not have electricity coverage; that is also 
the case with some of the new projects.  Orantes (2010) found out through 
a survey that, for nearby communities, one of the main causes of conflict 
was the despoliation of natural resources by private companies that left 
them with no substantial benefits.  GGEL failed to take into account the role 
of communities in the generation activity.  In fact, according to its vision of a 
free electricity market, it forbids large generation companies to sell and 
distribute electricity (Article 7) or to use it as payment or as a medium of 
exchange for goods or services (Articles 34, 61).  This prohibition makes 
sense, given the network that it embodies, since those measures prevent 
the distortion of the market.  However, in the context of conflicts over 
resources, it is an obstacle, since the best negotiating asset for both 
companies and communities would be electricity access at minimum cost.  
Instead, GGEL contributes to creating a scenario in which the most valuable 
good produced in a region is taken away and used in distant, more 
urbanized communities; this effect links hydroelectricity to other extractive 
industries. 
Furthermore, Martínez and Villagrán (2009) argue in their study of 
agrarian conflicts that the legal framework for electricity was designed to 
prioritize energy projects over the damages for rural communities. Orantes 
(2010) summarizes it by saying that the legal framework ignores a key 
aspect, interdependency on the use of natural resources.  By doing so, it 
shifts the burden of the industry costs to communities, and releases the 
government and private companies from accountability, so they can focus 
on expanding the energy market with maximum efficiency. 
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Figure 4   The network driven by GGEL and its role in the conflicts over 
hydroelectricity (prepared by the author). 
Let us summarize the role of GGEL in this stage as detailed in figure 5:   
(a) The GGEL, a law made with a vision of increasing efficiency by 
liberating the market, mandates de–monopolization and disintegration of 
the vertical structures of public electricity utilities. 
 (b) The Arzú administration, as part of its privatization policy, sells 
EEGSA and the distribution companies of INDE created by GGEL to Spanish 
companies.   
(c) These actions cause a boom in the generation business, attracting 
foreign and national companies that will eventually organize in industry 
associations like ADG and AGER.   
(d) The lobbying of AGER and ADG with the next president, Alfonso 
Portillo, resulted in the new law of incentives for renewable energy, LIDREP.  
(e) LIDREP brought the second wave of electricity generation expansion. 
 (f) However, most of these new projects were met with protests and 
conflict with nearby communities.  The latter can be attributed partly to 
their historical distrust of government and of foreign interventions in their 
territories, but also to their exclusion from the political process, exemplified 
in both the objectives and spirit of GGEL and LIDREP. 
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Conclusion 
This initial account already shows some of the insights that the ANT 
approach has to offer.  Previous studies on electricity expansion (Paz 
Antolín, 2004) and on hydroelectricity conflicts (Orantes, 2010) come to a 
similar conclusion: that the legal framework for the former was made within 
the neoliberal state of mind, which bet on efficiency and the free market as 
the solution to the urgent need to expand electricity coverage.  Both studies 
attributed the approach of that frame to the agency of the international 
wave of neoliberalism of the time and its national counterparts, right–wing 
governments.  This study shows that such a picture is incomplete, since it 
paints the legal frame as a mere intermediary, a vessel of the values and 
motives of the political elite of the period.  Instead, GGEL is shown here as a 
mediator (Latour, 2005), an actor that not only embodies the network that 
created it, but also modified it.  As Akrich (1994, p. 220) puts it, ‘technical 
objects not only define actors and the relations between them, but to 
continue functioning must stabilize and channel these’. The focus of GGEL 
on efficiency and the free market eventually destabilized the hydroelectric 
expansion, since the network it embodied did not include the rural 
communities it was supposed to benefit.  In other words, GGEL failed to shift 
to the role of mere ‘silent intermediary’, as technical objects do.  
This account also shows partially why GGEL came into law, since it takes 
into account the agency of other non–human actors, beyond the political 
and social elite and international neoliberalism: Chixoy dam, with its 
maintenance and structural problems that increased the risk of failure of the 
electrical grid, and the ‘El Niño’ phenomenon, which brought climate 
instability and droughts that bared the fragility of the system.  These not–
accounted–for actors help to explain why efficiency was a central part of the 
proposed solution, why the law passed with little resistance from opposing 
parties, and why legislation that was supposed to bring a new era of wide 
electricity access, ended up fuelling conflicts against the very expansion it 
was supposed to create. 
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